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ABSTRACT The purpose of this paper is to make a highly topical and practical contribution by 
investigating the interplay between capital and liquidity risk management and managerial decision-
making in banking, following the Basel III introduction for enhancing the safeguards against systemic 
risk. Specifically, we attempt to gauge the experience and assess the degree of tensions among 
banking practitioners’ perspectives on the reformed banking liquidity practice and risk-capital 
management in light of the newly introduced increased capital and liquidity requirements, which are 
to become fully and unilaterally effective as of 2019. As currently seen the liquidity provision 
requirement has become a distinct form of ‘sharing’ financial risks in the global economy, which 
includes the supply of capital from its issuers. This article reviews the issue from a European 
perspective attempting to gain insight into: (i) the suggestion that the new regulations lack internal 
consistency owed to their complexity, which creates the potential for both inter- and intra-company 
regulatory capital arbitrage and credit constriction; and (ii) the suggestion that increased capital and 
liquidity requirements may have a significant impact on bank behaviour and/or certain business model 
segments. Both of the above can potentially distort managerial behaviour through altering managerial 
incentives and hence fail to adequately regulate bank behaviour. With regard to the liquidity 
requirements, whilst we do not attempt to quantifiably assess the degree to which liquidity regulations 
(the Liquidity Coverage Ratio in particular – LCR henceforth) affect returns on equity/assets to banks, 
our interviews are used as a triangulating measure for complementing quantitative studies that can 
provide a further insight into the perception of affecting managerial incentives. We aim to add to, 
update, and enrich the studies around the vital research question of whether the new regulation and 
liquidity standards can achieve their ultimate objective of upholding financial soundness and stability. 
Therefore, this research is important to complete the extant literature on updated insiders’ 
perspectives that investigate the effectiveness of the new regulatory framework imminently to be fully 
applicable by 2019. Where the views of the professionals who have voiced their concerns, support, 
and/or proposals provide for a material contribution, these have also been provided. 
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1. Introduction 
The provision of global bank capital and its management have experienced dramatic transformations, 
including changes in both long- and short-term borrowing, lending, deposits, and loans, as well as 
investing as a result of the later liquidity regulation overhaul. Liquidity risk reduction is one of the 
major targets of the new liquidity regulation particularly aimed at addressing the vulnerabilities of 
financial institutions, which became apparent during the recent financial crisis. Since the introduction 
of capital requirements of Basel I in 1992, banks have had to steadily raise their capital to risk-assets 
ratio.1 The new Basel III liquidity-related framework is a primary amendment in banking regulation as 
it has launched global liquidity standards for all internationally active banks, which are aimed at 
containing the risks surfaced during the last financial turmoil. Through a strenuous negotiation period 
- which lasted from February 2008 to June 2015 - the management of funding and liquidity vis-a-vis 
systemic risk has become a core part of the reform package, strategic planning framework, and 
proactive balance sheet management of banks. Liquidity in financial markets is often provided by 
specialised financial agents, such as commercial banks, market makers, trading desks in investment 
banks, hedge, and pension funds. Adverse shocks to the capital of these agents cause liquidity to 
decline and risk premiums to increase. Conversely, movements in the prices of assets held by liquidity 
providers feed back into these agents’ capital. 
 
A growing body of empirical literature documents the inter-relationships among the capital of 
liquidity providers, the liquidity that these agents provide to other participants, assets’ risk premiums, 
and importantly systemic risk considerations. Furthermore, such relationships are evident in the 
operations of major financial institutions, which in turn are interconnected through a complex web of 
trades such as carry-trade, pooled investments, inter-institution, and interbank loans with any adverse 
effect on any particular strain of the system percolating and transmitted through.2,3 Following the 
extant literature, the new liquidity regulations and their effect raise concerns regarding a two-fold 
issue: first, the potential for the reduction in investment returns4,5 and secondly, altered managerial 
incentives and regulatory capital arbitrage that re-introduces systemic risk.  
 
Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in 2008, funds doing business with Lehman collectively 
experienced a higher probability of failure, and the liquidity of the stocks that they were trading 
declined.6 In addition, bid-ask spreads quoted by specialists in the New York Stock Exchange widen 
when specialists experience losses.7 Outflows from hedge funds that perform the carry trade predict 
poor performance of that trade, with low interest-rate currencies appreciating and high-interest rate 
ones depreciating.8 Risk premia in commodity-futures markets do not fare much better either; linked 
also to capital arbitrage they are larger when broker-dealer balance sheets are shrinking.9  
 
Following from the above, in the case of banks, investments in a range of liquid assets which have 
experienced a significant price decline may actually force the banks to be even more hesitant to trade 
even where the bid/ask spread is slim and the price drop appears to be controllable (i.e. the sale would 
seem to be justified realistically nearer the market price). A disposal would crystallise the risk-making 
loss and eliminate the bank’s ability to recuperate from any potential subsequent gains associated with 
recovery. Consequently, despite capability to cover losses through capital, the institution may still be 
hampered by the fact that it is unwilling to trade and hence access to liquidity is diminished. This is 
also further side-corroborated by the fact that banks holding sizeable quantities of liquid assets cannot 
actually gain performance-wise due to the opportunity costs of holding thick, low-yielding 
portfolios.10,11  
 
Furthermore, there have been well-documented relationships between the profitability of banks and 
the level of holding liquid assets in the presence of regulations with banks most likely to replace loans 
with alternative forms of less risky assets, thus creating the potential to also restrict credit when credit 
is most needed.12,13 Banks will have to re-evaluate their service mix in order to equilibrate supervisory 
and regulatory requirements with associated costs and profitability. Following the new regulations and 
as at the time of writing, short-term/money market yields have been exceptionally low with many 
investors re-evaluating the tradeoffs among liquidity, quality, maturity and yields.14  
High quality and instant liquidity is costly; maintaining liquidity and credit quality comes at a current 
rate of marginally positive, or in the case of ultra-conservative investment vehicles, in the form of 
negative yields.  
 
Contrary to the above arguments, one could argue that in theory, and as an alternative for decreased 
bank financing, the capital markets may take on the role of finance provision. However, in European 
banking this appears to be questionable based on its atypical background; first, creditors in European 
banks are barred from Deposit Insurance and secondly, the development of corporate debt markets - 
with a high degree of risk-averse agents - in many countries is inadequate. European, non-financial 
institutions have traditionally been reliant on banks for borrowings compared to their US peers. This 
is an important aspect when assessing the impact of the liquidity regulation on the financial 
intermediation activities of banks which are further linked to economic growth in the region15 since 
they could be most strongly hit by Basel III due to their weaker funding position.4 
 
Figure 1 below shows that capital markets supply only 30% of the funds to European, non-financial 
companies compared to approximately 80% in the US.16 
 
Secondly, despite the fact that higher liquidity costs might indeed reduce returns on investment, one 
could also argue that this corresponds to market risk not systemic risk. Yet, it is vitally important to 
ensure that regulation properly considers the interface between banking risks and markets in periods of financial distress. Liquidity mismatching in banking has long been widely accepted as a 
natural, daily, (low perception) risk by design and due to the nature of operations involved and it is 
dealt with accessing the interbank markets; but it transforms to very high risk when there is a 
generalised liquidity shortage.17 
 
Before discussing the current, topical research literature and portraying any provisional conclusions, a 
few material limitations must be cited. First, at the end of 2015 revisions to Basel III on the 
international capital and liquidity standards devised after the financial crisis were thought to be agreed 
upon and in place by 2017; while progress has been made, that has not happened fully yet, due to 
some European authorities’ scepticism of higher capital demands for banks in the European 
jurisdiction. It is only lately that some form of final agreement seems it might be reached. Yet, the 
formalised liquidity regulation in the current Basel III framework is currently not fully and 
unconditionally in place.  
While the LCR is under full implementation with banks geared up to fully comply with the 
requirement, the NSFR has yet to be implemented fully. This forces us to accept only cautioned 
conclusions at this stage. Such a factor is not yet in a position to be sufficiently controlled for and any 
conclusion drawn surrounding the impact of liquidity regulations in their totality must be observed as 
delicate. As such, an assessment of the long-term impact would be hard to predict accurately as the 
liquidity standards can only be computed for a very short time. The collective impact on the total 
weighted average liquidity is still unclear given that the Net Stable Funding Ratio is not yet fully or 
unilaterally disclosed by all internationally active banking institutions. A few tasks still remain 
unresolved, such as for example the gap between the banks’ internal calculations of Risk Weighted 
Assets the standardised approach, which typically yield higher RWAs and lower capital ratios. 
 
The new rules – arguably far more rigorous formalisations of the important relationships between 
liquidity and financial stability – are well intended but also risk the introduction of unintended effects, 
such as for example distorting managerial incentives and leading to capital arbitrage as well as 
introducing frictions and cutting back on the provision of credit. Europe is the focus of the study due 
to its unique financial landscape as we discuss further below, yet this research aims to promote a more 
generalised, widely applicable, and improved appreciation of the role of regulation and banking 
supervision. This is the focus of the next section where the context of European banking is reviewed 
before our research results are presented. 
 
2. Background  
Banks in particular are naturally exposed to tensions between liquidity shortages and solvency risk, 
especially as banking insolvency invariably precedes illiquidity. Liquidity is a thorny issue to define 
and even trickier to determine.18 However, this makes it especially challenging to ‘pro-actively’ 
distinguish temporary illiquid from insolvent banks. Runs on deposits for example, if sustained, can 
induce liquidity freezes, fire sales of assets, capital controls (as in the case of Greece recently), and 
interlocked repayment failures, all of which generate risk.19 The European banking union has more 
strongly supported that a fragmented, market-by-market, nation-by-nation approach does not operate 
successfully. In European banking, however, despite the institutionalisation of the second European 
banking directive (the ‘passporting’ directive), there have been numerous high-profile cases where it 
has become obvious that Europe still has a long way to go for becoming a wholly amalgamated 
financial market. There seems to be a growing conflict between the principles of mutual 
understanding among regulatory agencies, the unambiguous and rigid national mandates of the topical 
regulatory authorities and practitioners on the other.17 According to some bank representatives as 
well, as it will be shown in our analysis further below, there is a strong reaction by practitioners since 
the specifications as set by the Basel Committee already reach so far that the industry talks about 
Basel IV. 
 
Part of the tension is the result of some important aspects being ignored by regulators: one, the vast 
majority of large, international, and also nationally systemic European banks have strengthened their 
balance sheets and capital levels significantly since the crisis, as all seem to meet core equity capital 
requirements well above the minimum stipulations. A characteristic example of this is the very recent 
stress-testing success of UK banks under extreme market conditions. Two, as argued above, the 
European economy, unlike that of the US, is largely bank-financed. This brings into discussion the 
high-risk discrimination aspect of the respective portfolios of the two ‘banking type markets’. For 
example, the US banks have tended to keep the riskiest part of their commitments (and the most 
profitable) on their balance sheets due to securitisation and deeper financial markets that allow them 
to take the remainder off their balance sheets; government assurances, whether plain or implied, 
further allow them to obtain cheaper debt financing compared to equity funding and further enhance 
their incentives for regulatory capital arbitrage. On the other hand, stronger risk models and 
favourable weights for well-rated and well-secured credits have encouraged EU banks to keep these 
loans on their balance sheets and the E.U target aims for a strengthened capacity of such institutions 
not only to withstand shocks but also to deliver prosperity to the people of Europe. Furthermore, 
while the US regulator for example has called for stricter controls on the use of internal models, every 
model in use by European banks has been approved and authorised by both national and European 
regulators. The harmonisation efforts of the regulators to reduce disparities and to create a level 
playing field with regard to the existing risk-weighted systems (internal vs. standardised and U.S vs. 
Europe, for example) is logical. It should not arrive at the expense of any system or market or 
dislocate the funding and growth of the real economy or discourage effectively diversified portfolios 
and sound risk management practices.  
2.1 Liquidity, credit constriction, and capital arbitrage  
Critics of Basel III point out that there is an implementation inconsistency among various national 
regulators.20 They have argued that it was not Basel’s II shortcomings per se but this inconsistency in 
the application of the regulatory approaches on the use of external credit ratings in Europe and the US 
as well and that in itself further incentivised regulatory arbitrage. The new framework has also been 
criticised as a less-effective, rigid, one-size-fits-all approach and that it creates the potential for further 
credit constriction and regulatory capital arbitrage.21,22,23 Similar criticism, utilising the UK banking 
context as the object of the study, has been directed at the application of the substance-over-form 
principle in that regulators should actually seek to provide liquidity guidance on a case-by-case basis 
in their effort to achieve stability and avoid inertia as the result of blanket regulation.24 In the same 
line of scepticism there have been equally fundamental questions as to the extent to which a 
globalised form of bank financial management is indeed desirable or even attainable.25   
Furthermore, some very recent research in the US and the UK discusses the liquidity rules that are 
shaping the global banking industry in its totality conclude that such regulation is not likely to achieve 
its mandate in safeguarding the system and de-risking the banks. The criticism revolves around the 
fact that while regulations seek to shape management behaviour they actually fall short of 
appropriately recognising the significance of shareholder value-driven business models; these are the 
real drivers of management behaviour in banking and hence they run the risk of distorting behaviour 
in the wrong direction. That is, re-allocating risks according to driving market and regulatory 
arbitrage conditions and therefore avert the intended outcomes originally aimed at.26 Interestingly, 
some other recent research regarding European banks evaluates the effects of phased-in, gradual 
increases of liquidity coverage ratios as per the regulations; the study concluded that the systemic risk 
profile of the system is not improved and may even deteriorate.27 The same study proposes a cross-
sectional but case-by-case, differentiated, application of liquidity regulations.   
On one side, firmer regulation has considerably decreased the ability and the ‘enthusiasm’ of financial 
intermediaries to be involved in the money markets and on the other it creates the potential for such 
institutions to willfully refrain from lending also. Exhibit 1 below shows the updated, formalisation 
process of the LCR computation.28 Within the context of European banking the threat is that banks 
may redirect (new) funding towards LCR-compliant investments rather to investments that are 
normally typified as illiquid and risky such as loans. For example, banks could issue extra deposits 
with their central banks in order to strengthen their liquidity cushion. Such a risk could grow to be 
especially acute since the regulations - in their current form - potentially may be a considerable barrier 
for trade finance impairing growth and revival. Following this, three further and closely related 
aspects need also be considered: first, assets that are impaired the most when collective liquidity 
shrinks offer the highest expected returns and risk; research has shown that such assets may be 
absorbed by many agents in the economy, but actually arbitrageurs may be better placed to actually 
take up such shocks;29 secondly, this creates the potential for establishing inter-bank lending as even 
more desirable to financing corporates, which would result in resources that typically sustain trade 
being reallocated to banks, increasing in this manner interconnectedness and system-wide riskiness; 
and thirdly, this could also encourage banks to set up intra-group liquidity facilities that otherwise 
could build up the resilience of the system to peripheral shocks. The arguments above run counter to 
the regulators’ intended aims. This is also because the penalising treatment in the LCR and the related 
costs would ill-incentivise banks from maintaining liquidity lines with counterparts. This is a vicious 
circle, as liquidity provisions and lines of credit are major tools that bankers utilise in order to 
alleviate a liquidity squeeze through tension phases.  
 
 
The evidence so far has been – justifiably - mixed and inconclusive. Some researchers highlight the 
contagion-limiting effect of liquidity rules where they document that a tougher liquidity regulation 
decreases bank interconnectedness, mitigates the transmission of shocks, and strengthens the stability 
of financial institutions and the system as a whole.30 Yet, some professional bodies have expressed 
their serious scepticism that crucially the liquidity regulations could result in thwarting out productive 
investments and neuter nearly €1Trillion out of the real economy in Europe.31 Contrary to that, 
proponents of the new regulation indicate that the liquidity buffers reduce systemic risk in that 
ultimately they make banks more resilient and less vulnerable to bank runs, and this is because 
creditors are more confident that the bank will meet its financial obligations.32 The latter is directly 
contested, though once again through very recent research that examines the effect of liquidity 
regulations on creditors. It supports the view that the new liquidity rules also communicate 
information about future bank profitability and this information is seen as negative news by the 
creditors. Creditors perceive the liquidity regulation as an increased probability of bank default.33 In a 
similar strain of research that examines share price reaction to liquidity reform announcements it is 
suggested that shareholders perceive the adoption of the liquidity regulations as decreasing bank 
profitability.34 
 
Higher capital and liquidity levels should in principle also reduce the probability of future 
governmental intervention and public bail-outs. However, the contradiction is that the LCR is not a 
macro-prudential instrument; and it should not be intended to ‘discharge’ regulators of intervention 
and enable banks to endure liquidity strains alone and hence to remain solvent during stress times. It 
is rather intended to ‘make time’ for controlling insolvency-related costs and providing confidence in 
the system that problematic banks can either be salvaged and/or possibly be orderly wound down, 
avoiding in this manner impending, uncontrollable systemic implications resulting from a dis-ordered 
meltdown. Indeed, regulatory and administrative requirements produce costs associated with the 
constraints placed on banking conduct;35 one can also argue that the proposed liquidity reforms show 
promise but the concern is whether such costs are well justified, and as yet, their effectiveness is 
mostly unverified. Research has shown that at heightened periods of liquidity crunches the LCR 
measure becomes much less effective and the lender of the last resort has to support the system.36 A 
distinct, yet related area under examination is also the regulators’ intention to reduce the incentives 
for regulatory capital arbitrage through securitisation and credit risk transfer transactions that attract 
lower charges since it is much harder for assets to migrate from the banking to the trading book under 
the new regime.37  
 
 
Research carried out in UK banks has shown that a positive link exists between securitisation and 
bank credit risk where securitisation has been significantly driven by: i) the search for liquidity 
funding and ii) regulatory capital arbitrage and credit risk transfer.38 It is to regulators’ credit to 
attempt and modify/influence bank behaviour towards the ‘appropriate’ direction through steering 
banks to re-think and de-leverage their business models. That is, banks will have to amend their 
business models considerably before they are in a position to originate assets that are fully viable and 
designated for use as safe collateral. Contrary to that, banks are unable to do so or banks that utilise 
deposits for an ever-expanding loan book then they would ignore the longer-run risk that this will add 
considerably to their cost structure, since their liquid asset constraints will be higher. It is the latter 
that also gives rise to the concern regarding the restriction of credit. 
 
Proposals in support of a modified liquidity approach formulate a strategy in which banks are 
allowed, on a case-by-case basis, to securitise particular types of loans in order to convert illiquid 
assets into liquid funds. Through this type of securitisation the banks' holdings of liquid assets are 
reduced and the credit supply expands. Thus, it can also provide an additional source of financing and 
at the same time enables banks to withstand changing cost structures due to external shocks. The 
counter-argument though is that such a process could potentially: i) force banks to compete 
simultaneously for particular types of assets, ii) neuter the ability of authorities to influence the credit 
cycle when it is deemed necessary for the economy, and iii) make institutions prone to a 
liquidity/funding supply crisis if the securitisation market freezes.39 In that manner, critics have also 
argued that – no matter whether intended/ unintended - it creates the real potential to actually 
manoeuvre institutions out of the securitisation market.28 This side of the debate is still not settled to 
an extent: as argued earlier final agreement has not yet been reached; the model and the markets are 
still untested; and it still is very early to conclude that the new regulation will either actually improve 
the liquidity buffers of banks or it will actually result in a decrease of the overall market liquidity by 
moving banks out of the securitisation market. 
 
2.2 Profitability, incentives, and restrictions to lending  
 
Turning now to the arguments and substantiation of the theories regarding challenges to the banks’ 
profitability and as a result of lending and behaviour distortion, the evidence has so far also been 
mixed and inconclusive. This is partially because the data relating to liquidity measurement utilised in 
various recent studies either could not be easily obtained publicly or their relevance has been 
relatively limited; a large quantity of that data related to the pre-crisis events whereas current data is 
still largely in the process of collection and testing, particularly the NSFR-related data. Up to now, the 
research and the associated literature on the impact of the new liquidity constraints for example, on 
Net Interest Income (NII henceforth) are ambiguous; there is no clear directional confirmation as to 
whether NII increases or reduces in response to liquidity requirements. 
 
As already mentioned one string of research has sustained that low-yielding liquidity and 
comparatively high costs of longer-term funding can potentially hurt bank profitability. Some studies 
establish a direct decrease in the return on equity (ROE) index, a typical measure of bank profitability. 
Research conducted internationally has found that while the best, cost-efficient approach is to 
elongate the maturity of wholesale funding and increase the volume of high-grade assets such an 
approach is expected to trim net interest margins (NIMs hereafter) down by a range of 70-88 basis 
points on average.40 The effect is also most dramatic among European banks, specifically the large 
economies of France, Germany, the UK, and Switzerland that already experience thinner NIMs. These 
banking markets are also assessed as having the lowest starting longer-term funding in place owed to 
their business models in general that are more diversified; nowadays, there is a disincentive to rely on 
deposits and more reliance on short-term maturity funding (as well as generous acquisitions of assets 
held for trading which must be 100% funded). In these markets, as a direct result of the downward 
pressures on lending margins, a drastic bank balance sheet restructuring has been necessary to meet 
the long-term funding requirement.41 Nevertheless, it has been argued that for regulation to be 
effective it will necessarily constrain the regulated from achieving their preferred, arguably 
unrestricted positions, often by lowering their profitability.42 
The experience of the crisis has however demonstrated that some trade-off in profitability versus 
resilience is justified. Banks already seek out ways to manage ROE in the new level playing field by 
trimming costs, adjusting prices with significant pressures generated in the specialised lending, trade 
finance, trading, and securitisation businesses. EU banks reported an average RoE of 5.7% as of June 
2016, down by more than 100 basis points compared to June 2015. Profitability remains a source of 
concern in the EU banking system which is confirmed by the fact that the RoE remains well below 
banks' cost of equity, which stands at around 7-8%.43 With the regulatory agenda soaking up resources 
banks seem to reposition themselves for a period of prolonged low growth partly owed to the new 
requirements.44  
 
Hence, the new requirements have had a more intense impact on bank operations and business 
models. They have also induced changes in behaviour and have rendered some (formerly) most 
profitable business tactics less viable which, has led to declining financial performance. Banks’ 
maintenance of healthy profitability and hence sectoral stability will largely depend on their capacity 
to acclimatise their service mix to the new operating level playing field.45 This may also force banks 
to concentrate on their core competencies and markets with the potential of divestment of ‘auxiliary’ 
activities; for example, Greek banks faced with pressurised interest margins had to withdraw their 
investments and provision of credit in the Balkans’ area and reposition themselves largely to the 
inward-looking Greek market. Using UK bank data, researchers find that an increase in capital 
requirements of one percentage point reduces the growth rate in real lending by 4.6% and credit 
growth by 6.5-7.2%.46,47 Similar results are obtained in other recent research; using the 
recapitalisation exercise of 2011-2012 by the European Banking Authority (EBA), where the EBA 
announced the intention to implement capital ratios higher than previously anticipated in the transition 
to Basel III, researchers find that an increase in the regulatory ratio by one percentage point was 
associated with a reduction in banks’ provision of credit by 1.2%.48  
 
In an interesting study based on French banking data that includes an estimate of the impact of the 
new requirements on banks as well as firms, it is shown that a one percentage point increase in capital 
requirements leads to a reduction in lending between 3 and 8%, with an attendant significant negative 
impact on firms’ investment and employment.49 Similarly, in the UK, an increase in the aggregate 
requirement during an economic upswing is associated with a reduction of lending, with the potential 
for constricted lending being larger to the corporate sector than to households.50 Moreover, negative 
shocks to bank equity ratios for leverage-constrained banks substantially lower funding flows to more 
productive firms and as a result large output losses occur welfare-wise. 
 
Actually, some further argue that within the financial services sector - based on the current conditions 
and current regulation - non-banking institutions are likely to gain, especially those with low balance 
sheet risk that are less vulnerable to lower profits. In addition, among banks, domestic retail banks 
with little market exposure may as well be much better placed to absorb the regulatory impact of 
liquidity requirements51 and consequently alter the level playing field; many bankers have reacted in 
that there is no one-size-fits-all strategy for business model adjustment and that the optimal strategy 
should depend on a case-by-case basis and on the operating environment of each individual bank. 
Indeed, in the UK for example, one of the powers of the FPC is to direct a change in sectoral capital 
requirements when it is deemed necessary to do so. Perhaps a clearer exposition of the current issues 
faced can probably be shown by examining the anticipated effect of the earlier liquidity regulations 
proposed right after the crisis (from 2010 and until 2014) and the revisited effects right after their 
recalibration (2015 onwards). It has been argued that the added liquidity requirements explicitly 
decrease credit and the associated welfare, through a reduction in indebtedness and lending leading to 
inefficient allocation of capital.  
 
Earlier, yet highly topical research has shown that, firstly, under the liquidity requirement there is a 
positive correlation between the capital ratios and systematic shocks which increases considerably as 
a consequence of institutions being unable to extend lending in an expansion. Secondly, there is also a 
correlation in procyclicality between credit provision and capital ratios: while the addition of liquidity 
requirements to total capital reduces the procyclicality of credit, it also increases the procyclicality of 
capital ratios. At the same time, collectively, across the sector, capital cushions in recessions are not 
drastically dissimilar from the capital buffers of banks that are only subject to capital regulation. This 
is because liquidity requirements constrain a bank's maturity transformation function, forcing it to 
under-invest in lending, over-invest in unproductive liquidity buffers, and suppress further net interest 
margins with resulting implications for investment, growth, plus the potential for making the shadow 
The research concludes that the decrease in lending procyclicality is distorted toward the up-side, 
extensively impeding credit provision.52 More recent research has concluded that the attempt to make 
regulated banks less risky may actually raise their cost of capital, a heightened threat for the stability 
of the system.53 Furthermore, if creditors view the new liquidity standards as detrimental for bank 
soundness, they can potentially respond negatively increasing their perceived default risk following 
the regulatory events. Interestingly, research that has accounted for the country of origin (banks 
located in Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, and Spain (GIIPS)), which have been most strongly hit by 
the financial crisis, argues that investors in these countries are increasingly worried about bank default 
risk.54 
 
Such an effect might be more pressing only in the short term due to the ‘abrupt’ introduction of new, 
top-up liquidity regulations. Such effect is muted in the longer-term since the constraints imposed by 
the regulation on institutions in ‘normal times’ may be viewed as the cost of insurance vis-a-vis the 
liquidity shocks and their impact in crisis periods.55 Contrary to that, others argue that this might 
indeed occur only if banks’ optimum mix, status-quo targets, of asset and liability composition - are 
invariant to changes in capital regulation (that is, behaviour and hence their business models are 
unaffected by regulatory changes). The evidence regarding long-term effects suggests that this is 
potentially not the case. Economically speaking, the long-term impact on credit and the real economy 
is higher than the short-term impact. The empirical results suggest that the negative impact in the 
short- as well as the long-term appears larger than previously thought.56  
 
Other research does not confirm this negative relationship, illustrating instead the potential benefits of 
the adoption of the new standards. Using a near-full sample of commercial, cooperative, and savings 
banks in the EU, it has been shown that considering a crisis of a similar magnitude as the recent one, 
the potential costs for public finances decrease from roughly 3.7% of EU GDP (before the 
introduction of any new tool) to 1.4%.57 Others also do not find evidence that banks increased the 
average interest rates on loans to the non-financial sector; specifically, on a sample of yearly data for 
1098 banks from 27 EU countries for the period 2004 to 2011 findings suggest that competition exerts 
a positive influence on bank profitability. The results seem to corroborate the objective of European 
integration to improve pricing and competition on markets. In line with the competition impact on 
bank profitability, the size of banks doesn’t matter in the case of ROAE and has a small and week 
significant effect in the case of ROAA.58 Similarly, other research, when examining the drivers and 
outcomes of the NSFR prior to its introduction (1996- 2010), showed that the funding ratio did not 
significantly impact on a set of profitability variables.4 On a sample of US banking institutions a 
negative relationship between the NSFR and bank failure has been observed but no similar effect has 
been reported for the LCR.59 There is thus also a consensus on benefits around higher capital ratios 
reducing the probability and costs of the crisis including proposals that range from benefiting smaller 
banks against larger incumbents to altering managerial behaviour and increasing the liquidity reserve at the 
expense of retail lending. The crisis that affected the banking system had a negative effect not only on the 
price of credit to corporations, but also on the price corporations pay to guarantee access to liquidity.60 
Stronger liquidity requirements can potentially avert this undesirable, destabilising effect. Other 
empirical evidence has demonstrated that higher capital requirements increase the probability of 
survival for individual banks and at the same time preserve market share for medium-and-large-sized 
banks alike during banking crises with small banks enjoying such benefits at all times; these are 
encouraging results for the stability of the financial system as a whole. The same research concludes 
that higher capital ratios improve profitability for all banks at all times in the longer term.61 Along the 
same line of argumentation, research that corroborates the above from a risk perspective concludes 
that liquidity measures do not influence equity betas and as such market participants do not appear to 
materially integrate liquidity in their assessment of banks’ riskiness.62  
The authors add and caution that a potential explanation of this lack of causal relationship between 
liquidity and risk is that liquidity was not a material risk before the financial crisis and as such the 
data may also be limited in order to provide for a proper evaluation of the effect after the crisis. 
Others have approached the issue from a behavioural point of view claiming that in the absence of 
new regulation (i.e. Basel III) incumbents do not have any motives to change their business models in 
favour of a safer funding mix; they propose substitution of current funding by retail deposits where 
growth in retail funding decreases under stress times and substitution of capital market funding for 
higher regulatory capital in favour of stability and resilience.63  
 
Nevertheless, liquidity regulations are currently initially put to effect at the bank level. It merits 
consideration whether bank-specific characteristics and bank-specific behaviour (especially the 
dimension that is related to the liquidity standards) influence the market participants’ reaction. Hence, 
a material issue is to assess to what extent more, smarter, and better quality capital regulations impact 
the prospects of bank resilience during both normal and stress times (for example a system stress that 
has its origins in banking or in the capital markets).64 As a very recent professional research claims, 
this is going to be especially challenging for banks to achieve these requirements; they come at a time 
and place where net interest margins are under a continuous downward stretch as a result of lower 
interest rates; a higher rate of non-performing loans; ever-increasing regulatory requirements that 
push up banks’ financing costs; competitive pressures from existing banks, new entrant banks and 
non-banks65 (such as fin techs, for example). Others argue that this pressure is not what it currently 
seems to be in that as with any new regulation that reconstructs the system-wide regulatory 
foundations, short-term reactions are just noise relative to the long-term stabilising effects; they warn 
though that in order to have the intended results, considerable structural amendments are necessary, 
where failure to put into practice the required transformations may actually make the cure worse than 
the disease, thus increasing banking costs materially.66 
 
What the recent and previous crises have gradually - yet clearly - shown us is that regulation is an 
evolving organism that self-recognises its own policy limitations. The disagreement and lively debate 
over policy effectiveness seems to imply that Basel III should not be viewed as a complete regulatory 
framework once more. Rather, it represents, in essence, an ever-evolving system that requires 
continuing adjustments over time due to market innovations, industry developments and changing 
behaviour. To that it has been noted that the regulatory capital to be held by banks depends on three 
major factors: (i) the regulatory environment itself, (ii) market discipline (market-wide behaviour such 
as credit ratings, market participant, and competitor expectations) and (iii) risk management (internal 
qualitative factors including management’s behaviour, motives, and attitude towards risk). These 
factors suggest that banks may not respond to regulatory requirement in the manner assumed in many 
quantitative models and that caution should be exercised about any conclusions drawn from models 
that ignore these issues above.67 This is also what drives our research. 
 
A much more recent body of literature deals with the potential dynamic contribution that behavioural 
finance research could provide regarding the application of the macroprudential regulation to be 
employed in order to safeguard the financial system. This string of research concludes that there is 
limited current understanding of the interaction between micro-conduct in financial markets and 
macro-results in terms of financial stability.68 There is thus also scope for exploring alternative – 
complementary - backing in designing the official regulatory infrastructure in use for the new macro-
prudential instruments. It is the latter that we also argue has received much less attention; the issue of 
impact of capital requirements on banks and esoteric managerial behaviour. Since risk perception is a 
central factor influencing people’s reactions to events perceived as ‘threatening’, particular attention 
must be paid to managers’ responses to the risk information influencing their behavioural intentions. 
Attempts to balance regulatory concerns of solvency risk on the one hand and profitability and 
financial soundness on the other must be also preconditioned to understanding the managerial 
responses to regulatory jolts. This is an aspect sometimes ignored by regulators through their 
insistence on edging on ‘thin risk quotients’. 
 
 
3. Methodology 
This study utilises a behavioural approach coupled with quantified research data as presented above 
where it can cut across and within research strategies, as one of its features as a behavioural technique 
is to cross-check results deriving from both quantitative and qualitative research. It provides a 
platform to aid our attempt at coherence in universal studies of regulation, liquidity, and performance 
measures.  
Participants - data and analysis  
To provide for a systematic representation of the findings, the present study followed the standardised 
approach for content analysis. The procedure allows key categories to be identified and major themes 
to emerge from the data that consist of ideas and descriptions within a particular context that can be 
used to explain causal events, statements, morals and behaviour derived from the participants' views;73 
a characteristic in the reasoning of qualitative inquiry. The uniqueness of this research is that the 
sample banks involved include major banks affected by the new regulations in the UK (7 commercial 
banks), Greece (all 4 systemic banks), and Spain (3 commercial banks) where the most senior ranking 
officers served as the key informants and where we conducted in-depth interviews. Key informants 
provided most of the information for this study. The use of key informants is highly supported by the 
qualitative research literature.74 More specifically, the sample includes 14 in-depth interviews: these 
involve six Chief Executive Officers (CEOs), two Chief Finance (CFOs), one Chief Treasury Officer 
(CTO), three Chief Risk Officers (CRO)s, and two Head of Compliance Officers (CCOs). The 
interviews were a mixture of face-to-face and telephone interviews, subject to the participants’ 
preferences and convenience over which the researcher had little control. While some bankers made 
explicit that they wanted to be fully aware of the person they were dealing with, some others 
expressed their reservation about face-to-face interviews, due to time constraints and excessive 
workload.  
The procedure adopted in this study was to facilitate a set of in-depth semi-structured ‘elite’ 
interviews of officers of major commercial banks in Greece, Spain, and the UK, who were identified 
as the gatekeepers to inside information for guiding data generation. Elite interviews can play a very 
powerful role in research that traces the history, development, and implications of an important social 
phenomenon and is a vital element of research programs that engage with recent intentional human 
behaviour. It is an appropriate method for the study of recent historical change, process-tracing 
studies of policy enactment or implementation, in political or social activity, and the role of elites 
(broadly defined) in a political, social, or economic process.75 High-powered individuals can exert 
great influence over findings and ‘...although they may be remote from some aspects of what you are 
researching, they are likely to have a particularly comprehensive grasp of the wider context and to be 
privy to information that is withheld from others’.76 Elite interviews do directly what statistical 
analysis seeks to do indirectly; illustrate what approaches or values are associated, how robustly they 
are correlated, and how and why agents tie particular views. Semi-structured interviews gave us the 
opportunity to use some latitude in order to explore queries on what could be seen as a significant 
reply. All interviewees participated extensively in the discussion. The result was over 10 hours of 
recorded interviews transcribed onto over 105 pages with each interview lasting on average 
approximately 45 to 60 minutes. To show the derivation of conclusions from the data above, this 
paper presents the relevant tables based on our analysis as well as relevant direct quotes in the 
findings section. Although such presentation requires careful interpretation it helps to provide an 
overview of the emphasis in the bank manager (inter)views with respect to the specific risk 
management activities, perceptions, and behaviour. 
4. Findings 
 
We begin this section by presenting the results of our interviews’ analysis in tables 1, 2, and 3 below 
over three major emerging issue areas. As argued above - since implementation is scheduled to run 
until 2019 under the Basel Committee timetable – we interpret our results cautiously in light of the 
current developments but also due to a dynamically changing environment. The fact that some 
components of the regulatory framework are yet to be fully finalised and implemented, including the 
leverage ratio and the final Fundamental Review of the Trading Book renders the collective impact of 
a range of different rules not known in advance. In addition, the coming months will also be crucial 
for the competitive future of the European banking given the new General Data Protection Regulation 
(GDRP) that becomes fully operational and binding as of May 2018. Finally, some of our themes 
identified in this research span more than one emerging issue area hence they might appear 
successively in our analysis. Table 1 below summarises the first major impact as seen by our 
participants to be revolving issues related to bank business models.  
  
Table 1. Effect of changing regulatory requirements on banks’ business models emerging themes 
Codes Initiating Issues discussed Themes identified 
New capital requirements and impact on banks’ business models 
New product 
development Approval issues 
Any new product/service has to get official 
approval 
New product 
approval 
New business 
products/services Transparent chain of command 
Any new business/service has to get 
unanimous approval by involved Unanimity 
New business 
committee Committee focus 
New business committee which has 
complex structure with representatives 
from management, finance, risk and 
compliance sections 
Complexity 
Process Time constraints Process can now take up to 4 months 
Process 
lethargy/ lost 
business 
New businesses Example: Loan origination 
Deal with loan origination completely 
differently because of chain of command 
and regulatory restrictions 
Compliance 
restrictions 
Process Regulatory-driven / Material effect on business Compliance issues 
Complex 
compliance 
processes 
Process Client-driven demand Competition issues Conflict in process 
Volume of business Type of transactions Put a stop to big transactions  
Altered decision 
making motives 
/ competition 
Governance and 
Management Regulatory-driven  
Smaller vs. big transactions / short-term 
vs. long-term funding 
Legacy 
management 
and funding 
structures 
altered 
Opportunities for the 
banks New banks Competitors, mutant banks, Fintechs 
Opportunity for 
good 
management 
Incumbent banks Change of philosophy  
Complete change of philosophy that 
revolves around change in business models 
including funding structures 
Clarity and 
Strategic change 
management 
New Rules Response and retaliation Risk-transfer some of the risk back to investors with regulatory approval 
Innovative 
management 
Governance Balance Sheet Restructuring 
Counter-party risk has become central. 
Extensive revisions on existing portfolios 
and revamping especially in high-risk 
transactions as seen under the new rule-
book / competitive issues 
Brand 
management / 
Escaping a bad 
past 
Participants stressed that with regard to the impact the forthcoming regulation will have this revolves 
around three main pillars; new products, new businesses, and by extension, product and business risk 
compliance. While all agreed that the profitability and liquidity positions of the European banking 
sector have stabilised in recent years they also stressed that while regulation has been more risk-
advanced, they stated their apprehension that banks as individual businesses at the micro-level face 
several risks both in the short and the long run; these range from sometimes unnecessary complexity 
on management information structures and decision-making, slow response to market changes and 
reduced volume of business owing to the new regulation. Banking profitability and the linkages to the 
sustainability of their business models have emanated as special grounds for distress. Bankers clearly 
stated that they still make revisions to their product and service offer business models since these have 
suffered a multi-faceted impact. Yet, what also comes through is that several of the participants 
associate legacy management structures and the decision-making process setting as directly linked to 
business models. Many agreed that whilst their business models are client-driven, the process 
underlying the implementation of such models becomes regulatory-driven. They were unanimous in 
actually supporting the view that a great deal of stress has been directed to process setting, 
transparency, and accountable chains of command leading to a challenging to reconcile design: 
 
CFO 1: ‘Any new business idea now has to get approval by all of those people (management, finance, 
risk, compliance sections) before we can go any further. Whereas 10 years ago if you were a trader 
and you had an idea to trade swaps you just go to your line manager and say you want to trade 
swaps. You would apply for the limit, get the limit and you would be trading within a week. This 
process can now take 2, 3, 4 months. A slow response process. You will lose business and you are 
accountable’. 
 
CEO 1:'...Barclays...that would be my example as well. They have closed out some perfectly good 
trading businesses on the basis that it is not worth the [cost] for them from a regulatory perspective. 
There are a number of facets to that, and certainly Basel III is part of it’. 
 
CFO 2: 'Entrant banks will be incorporating the new rules as they simultaneously create their new 
business model. Whereas banks like us or Barclays and JP Morgan are the ones that are going to 
change their existing portfolios because they were so deeply involved in risky transactions.’ 
 
CTO: ‘We would look at new businesses going forward differently because of these rules. For 
example, 2 months ago we stopped a big transaction because we didn’t want to get stuck with big 
capital consumption.' 
 
CEO 2: ‘You had a department (emphasis added) there that was making a fortune and the 
management did not understand...[pause]...in the slightest. All they knew was getting a satisfactory 
revenue number. In those days they were quite happy as long as the revenue number was coming in 
quick and it was higher at the end of the year than the outflow costs and they didn’t really care what 
they were doing to get the return where actually there are a lot of things that are interplaying here: 
you had a situation where it was tolerated by the regulators, market shareholders and everybody else. 
You had the big old boys from the big city saying that they really didn’t understand what was going 
on in the business...[pause]....but there is senior management accountability now and I think within 
the new regulatory regime they are expected to not only able to produce this MI (Management 
Information), but they have to be able to comprehend it and see the bigger picture. It all links in 
together so you require a greater level of sophistication in the people at the top because they have 
personal accountability in a way they didn’t in the past.' 
 
CEO 4: ‘There has been reluctance to spend money on systems that give you that kind of visibility in 
the past, now it’s non-negotiable so we are investing in lots of systems and we are not the only bank. 
More reporting, more hierarchy, better systems, all that comes out of the cost of doing business. To 
get the granularity that you need, you need system hierarchy. There’s a knock on effect beyond just 
the headline; ‘here is the requirements’, there is a whole lot of stuff that has to happen for the firm to 
be able to address it. And it is not just changes in the business, there are pretty major things going on 
in the back office. I would say it is a revolution.’ 
 
The quotes above are indicative also of a historical, critical cultural split: the views revolving around 
reforming banks versus the views of reforming behaviour. More often than not, regulation and 
regulatory changes have been heavily criticised for actually targeting and failing to moderate and 
reform individual bank behavior as opposed to targeting and regulating an individual banker’s 
behavior; yet most participants felt that it is the latter that has been actually targeted through those 
newer changes: a forced, institutionalised change aiming to instill a change of mentality through 
governance reforms that aim to limit risk-incentivised behavior through the institutional 
transformation and emergence of hierarchical organisations that actually shape business models. The 
following quotes are examples of bankers’ split stance on the issue. One the one hand, there seems to 
be agreement surrounding the overall positive changes in management structures: 
 
CEO 3: ‘To be honest the people that were framing Basel I & II wanted more than they got, because 
there was a limit to what was politically possible to achieve. We are where we are and there is a 
greater consensus that having consistency at a high standard is a good thing overall. That wasn’t the 
political consensus before, there were a lot of countries that regarded it as detrimental to their sector 
if there were these standards and now I think having at least a solid minimum is regarded as good by 
almost everybody.'  
 
CRO 3: 'I think the genesis of the problem in the UK for example was a lack of comprehension within 
the regulators about the real risks that were posed to the financial system by ever increasing 
complexity within the financial system. The capital situation did not catch up with what was going on 
in terms of the innovations, the products and the risk profiles of those banks so it was not adequate to 
the task. As far as the banks that complain now that Basel III is overkill...[pause]...well it is not like 
they were managing themselves in a way that suggested that they were being honest about what their 
risks really were. And so I don’t think it is that surprising that you need a regulatory regime that 
imposes it, because they could have gone beyond the minimum capital standards in response to the 
risks they should have understood themselves. And when regulators started asking really deep 
questions about whether they understood the risks, it was questionable whether they really did 
themselves and regulators also didn’t.' 
 
On the other hand, there also seem to be conflicting views with regard to the new regulations and their 
effects for incumbents, competition, and profitability. Some of them may also imply the notion of 
window-dressing as well as the peculiar notion of ethics being instilled or taught by design: 
 
CEO 6: ‘Well if you look back, before the new regulation, the banks were stronger at the time so they 
could fight back against more regulation. Politically stronger, so they could lobby and get most things 
done. Politically stronger but I am not sure from the capital perspective. They can’t do it now because 
it would look bad.’  
 
CEO 5: ‘I think it depends on how developed banks are. The truth is in more complex markets you 
may need Basel II and Basel III, but if you are looking at a very basic banking system, I am not really 
sure it adds much. With Basel III you may have got a framework that makes a very complex situation 
manageable but then if banks are responsible for regulating themselves you don’t need these 
standards. You wouldn’t have needed them if there were responsible within the industry and the 
regulators had known what was going on, that is my personal view.’  
 
CRO 3: It is actually about conduct, reputation [and] a whole lot of other factors that feed into that 
decision to change. It can create opportunities for banks like us. What is a loss for one bank is 
sometimes an opportunity for another bank’. There are some banks though that will actually exit 
certain businesses because of it since the new regulations are more constraining for smaller players’. 
 
CCO 1: ‘From a transaction point of view I don’t think we will completely abandon any business lines 
[as a result] of capital requirements. Due to profitability problems, we are planning differently mostly 
because of tightening regulation and the entry of new players and operating models onto the market.’ 
 
CFO 2: ‘There’s actually opportunities for the banks that were not involved in the first place; it is the 
banks that were there to start off with who have got to now do this complete change of philosophy and 
they are the ones who have to change their business model. We are incorporating the new rules as we 
create our new business model.'  
 
CRO 1: ‘We are moving to Basel III with all the additional requirements, which includes market risk, 
not only on the trading portfolio, but also on non-trading portfolio. Furthermore it includes 
incremental risk, default risk, credit migration and counterparty risk in the derivatives business. We 
were not doing any of that and now we have to apply all these charges; we are planning particularly 
to downsize investment banking, decrease high-risk lending and foreign operations.’  
 
CCO 2: ‘Certainly banks are not making [as much] money. For us it has changed materially our 
business model in the UK, and it is changing the mentality of how we see the businesses in terms of 
profitability and capital requirements and we have to be very careful with that.’ 
 
The participants’ views imply that Basel III has also been utilised by policy and law-makers as a tool 
to overhaul regulation at the micro-level in an effort to enhance market discipline, reduce moral 
hazard, and instil ethics. While it can be considered rational to assume that such perceptions point to 
altered management structures, clearer chains of command and hence transparent accountability that 
lies directly with the decision maker(s) behaviour it is also safe to say at this point that this is yet to be 
seen at the micro-level; imposing fines on a bank (i.e. the institutional level) has different attributes to 
imposing fines on a banker.  
 
Furthermore, Basel III has also highlighted the importance of the macro-prudential policy dimension 
in effective supervision, reducing the probability of market failure and making markets more robust 
on aggregate. The two sections that follow below address two major parts of macro-prudential 
regulations namely, the regulations pertaining to the treatment of market versus trading book 
operations (table 2) as well as the new liquidity requirements (table 3). We begin with table 2 below 
on gauging and summarising insiders’ perceptions on the applicability, enforceability, and 
effectiveness of this dimension of the enhanced regulatory framework. 
 
Table 2. New boundaries treatment 
Codes  Initiating Issues discussed Themes identified 
Impact of newly imposed boundaries between the trading book and the banking book under Basel III 
Return-driven decisions Risk-return profile 
Banks are paying more 
attention to capital 
requirements due to large 
capital consumption 
transactions rendering 
returns unworthy 
Trade-offs 
Regulatory-driven 
decisions Evidence of challenges 
To make sure a bank is 
delving deep enough 
down and evidence of 
knock-on expectation not 
just from the risk of doing 
a trade 
Bank-wide impact 
Treasury Operations 
Own proprietary trading 
transforming to a 
partnership management 
as opposed to trading 
operations 
Treasury operations are 
the ultimate liquidity and 
funding managers 
Change in trading 
strategy 
Basel III induced 
structural changes 
Major changes in treasury 
management 
Treasury centrality; 
liquidity based on 3 
central concepts; LCR, 
NSFR and loan /deposit 
ratio 
Impact on the funding 
structure 
Basel III Consistency Inconsistency in standards 
Limits some of the 
discretions that used to 
have under Basel II but 
still Basel III presents 
elements of uneven 
implementation across 
banks and regulatory 
arbitrage which is 
probably not a good thing 
Uneven implementation 
and regulatory arbitrage 
Regulatory Challenges  High Costs of implementation 
As banks stand they are 
not profitable and with 
very low confidence 
The negative effect on 
lending / constricted 
expansion 
Costs 
Marginal expenses 
transformed to major 
costs 
Incumbents constrict 
competition due to higher 
cost absorption capacity / 
systemic risk becomes 
central again 
Competitive advantage 
Competition Boundary problem 
Standards raise the bar 
too high. Cost for new 
entrants reduces 
competition/stifles 
innovation. Depressive 
effects 
Reduces competition and 
credit provision 
Pressing Issues Unbalanced enforcement Recapitalisation reducing businesses 
Loan book reduction / 
credit constriction 
Support functions Triviality in the past 
Now they are central to 
the decision making, 
where the power lies with 
Senior risk officer and the 
Head of compliance. 
Management 
Restructuring and 
Treasury Centrality 
Non-trading / Funding 
decisions 
Client deposit-taking 
trivialisation 
Regulatory rigidity / 
KYC procedures 
excessively complicated 
Customer and funding 
base switch / competition 
/ opportunity costs 
Code of Business 
Conduct Changing ethics  
Business model changes 
designed to percolate 
through and regulate 
behaviour 
Changing the mentality 
System Tools 
Conservative and tight 
models and 
measurements 
Where for example it 
takes longer to get a 
mortgage and where the 
real economy is 
constrained to a degree 
by banks being very 
conservative, financial 
crises might be 
constrained as well.  
Resilience and Less 
cyclicality 
Prudence Resort on ethical behaviour 
Reduced government 
guarantees and tight 
capital standards actually 
force conservatism in the 
tax payer’s best interest. 
Conservatism / Reduce 
risky behaviour and 
moral hazard 
 
 
Starting at the bottom of the table above, there was widespread agreement in bankers’ perceptions 
regarding the risk-limiting effects that the new regulations will bring to markets. Their views express 
agreement over issues such as a systemic change in business conduct, risk measurements, stronger 
and more prudent management, and a (forced) changing mentality: 
 
CFO 1: ‘We were doing the stress testing before and measuring the risk. The problem was that 
everybody was saying ‘oh those crazy guys, the only thing they do is crunch numbers’. We would go 
to meetings and when talking about stress testing under very stressful scenarios everybody would say 
‘come on, we will never get there’. With Basel III we formalised a lot of things the banks were already 
doing. Many banks were already doing all the analysis such as incorporating tail risk with 
incremental risk charges, stressed VAR, counterparty risk and credit migration. Banks are certainly 
now more serious about stress testing for market risk, not only for trading, but also non-trading. They 
are also more serious about stress testing for liquidity, counterparty risk, and for credit migrations.’ 
 
CEO 2: ‘There is the argument that you need higher capital standards because of the moral hazard of 
that implied guarantee and that banks will always resort to a risky behaviour because they know that 
are effectively underwritten by the government and therefore if you have very tight capital standards 
you actually force [emphasis added] them to be conservative then you are acting in the tax payer’s 
best interest.’ 
 
CEO 5: ‘I remember a discussion with the financial officer for the Northern rock at the time when 
they went bankrupt and when asked why were you in these loans in America [subprime market] he 
said everybody else was and the shareholders demanded high returns.’ 
 
CRO 2: ‘Generally your risk can only be based on your historical data and up to the Lehman [crisis] 
your historical data contained relatively small market moves and afterwards it contained much bigger 
moves. So all these stress testing parameters and all your valuation models are suddenly now based 
on not 5% haircuts they are based on potential 25% haircuts. We do our stress testing with the 
Williams and if we compare our stress testing parameters now to what they were 10 years ago, they 
are a lot more severe because we have now realised that markets can be more severe. You can only 
do what you think at the time and 10 -15 years ago you would never think half of Europe would go 
bankrupt. You would never have thought there would be a case where half of the European countries 
couldn’t issue [bonds] into the market and you were going to get places like Ireland, Portugal and 
Spain nearly go bankrupt. That was unheard of. So now we are incorporating those ideas into our 
stress testing models which is why they have to be a lot more severe because the reality is these things 
can happen.’ 
 
CFO 2: ‘In the past we were not really considering the counterparty credit risk, and the CVAs [credit 
valuation adjustments]. All these things come together to significantly increase capital requirements. 
Is it much better? Yes, it is better than before when we were using VAR. From the market risk 
perspective we are talking about not only trading portfolios but non-trading portfolios.’ 
 
CEO 3: ‘We are now doing Basel III metrics that are based on what happened in the most extreme 
circumstances, which is good for banks, regulators and good for the economy as a whole. I emphasise 
how that Lehman weekend changed the whole markets. We are now using that as our model. We 
thought that [previous stress tests] were the worst that could happen, but actually Lehman is the 
worst that could happen and therefore that’s why everything has changed because since Lehman, the 
idea of what was a stress situation suddenly multiplied ten folds. VAR up to then was adequate for 
what it was, because we thought that is what could happen in the worst situation. You thought you 
would get 5% haircuts, well actually after Lehman you were getting 40% haircuts, you couldn’t even 
get rid of things like the Greek, Portuguese and Italian bonds. I mean that was 4 - 5years of major 
upheaval in the markets which is now completely made people rethink the definition of what is the 
worst case scenario.’ 
 
CFO 3: ‘One thing the regulators want to see is challenge, anytime you have things like audits, board 
meetings or committees, they want to see evidence of challenge. So when you are having your meeting 
they want to know that the risk manager is challenging the business line heads as to why they want to 
do certain transactions; just to make sure you are delving deep enough down that you know what to 
expect not just from the risk of the trade but also how it impacts the rest of the bank. If you want an 
example of how the new rules will affect the business model, 10 years ago as the treasury in the bank 
we were doing our own proprietary trading. Now we are just purely what I would call a partnership 
management operation as opposed to a trading operation. So that stuff has gone out of the window 
and we now employ people to do fixed income, swap, and derivatives trading. Now most banks 
treasury operations are purely just treasury, they are liquidity managers and funding managers. That 
has changed and streamlined the business model.’ 
 
There was however, equal scepticism with regard to some other regulatory-induced challenges faced 
by banks. These revolve around management structures and costs imposed and their effect for credit-
provision, inconsistencies in the structural changes imposed by the regulators, and implementation 
inconsistencies in some major standards potentially leading to regulatory capital arbitrage from 
another avenue. Starting with regulatory-imposed costs, several participants expressed the view that 
such costs while they appeared marginalised/trivialised in the past are actually much larger, more 
central, restrict competition, and are profit motive-repressing:  
 
CEO 4: ‘...Let’s be clear about something: When talking about the business model one sometimes 
assumes that one is just talking about front office, but your existence for example here in London is a 
symptom of changes that are happening in back office. Our business model is carrying more costs for 
support because of the extra analysis required. Risk is more a complicated world than it used to be, 
it’s bigger and the compliance of all this stuff takes up a lot of resources. The truth is downsizing 
since our business model has moved to carrying greater support costs and staff because of the new 
capital requirement rules.' 
 
CEO 6: ‘That’s one of the issues they [Basel] have got. It’s alright bringing in all these regulations 
but the downside is they are costly to banks. If banks are not profitable, you don’t get the confidence 
therefore they don’t lend anymore and you get a vicious circle. They are piling on more pressure on 
the banks because they are less stable and we are now in a situation where they are creating more 
regulations which make banks less profitable. This makes the regulators think banks are less stable so 
they respond with even more regulation. At some point the regulators have to ease off and let banks 
have a chance to recapitalise, get their profits and revenues up so they get money coming in. But they 
are never going to do that because to the public, especially in the UK it looks bad. At the moment the 
balance is not there, it is against businesses and the challenge is trying to get banks recapitalised. The 
downside of that is if banks are trying to recapitalise, they retransfer funds, they reduce credit by 
reducing their loans books because they have to reduce business.’  
 
CCO 1: The question is that by enforcing those standards you then raise the bar so high that the costs 
for new entrants, such as for example compliance and their funding structure, actually reduce 
competition. Competition and innovation is another one of the main objectives of Basel but Basel III 
has a depressive effect on both of these.’ 
 
CFO 1: ‘Where decisions about your business strategy are starting to become impacted by those costs 
which used to be marginal but which are now becoming so high that actually you have to take them 
into account when you decide to stay in the market or enter into a new market. This leads to the 
bigger banks ending up with a competitive advantage because they can more easily deal with those 
costs. So you are finding within RBS for example, they are getting rid of all their overseas operations 
whether or not they make money on the basis they are not going to have critical mass in that market 
and that they have got to focus at home and deal with regulatory change there and they just don’t 
have the time to deal with anything else. So questions that used to asked about how well a business is 
run and how profitable it is, is less of a concern now than whether you have the management capacity 
to be able to run an empire that size.’  
CTO: ‘It’s spawning this huge business of support functions. These support functions – well not 
exactly trivialised in the past - they were auxiliary. But this isn’t the case with global banks: their 
front office just saw that transaction but they’ve got to be able to see the opportunity cost of doing 
something. It is about thinking through lots of permutations and in a very big organisation, it has 
become a very complex task. So there is a whole army people doing that stuff now. Nowadays they are 
more central to the decision making, and now suddenly the power lies with the chief risk officer 
(CRO) and the head of compliance (CCO). You have got people like the CRO, head of fixed income 
and even myself [Treasury] making some decisions like turning down client deposits because the KYC 
procedures and funding have now become too complicated and expensive. So you are also making 
decisions based on non-trading ideas.’ 
 
CEO 3: ‘I think banks are now more careful on the transactions that they are entering into. In the 
past we were just doing trades and we were not that concerned about capital requirements but now 
we are more careful. This is because we know that if we are going to do a transaction that is going to 
have a big capital consumption we may be stuck with that capital consumption for 3 to 5 years and if 
the return is not going to be particularly rewarding we basically don’t approve the transaction 
because the Tier 1 capital based on Basel III is limited. I believe now banks are paying more attention 
to the capital requirements. Whereas before banks were more concerned about profits and they didn’t 
care about the capital requirements. The demand was driven by higher profits and large volumes, 
which is not the case now. The low confidence has been reflected in lower commissions, lower fees 
and trading income. I can give a lot of examples in this organisation where we have basically stopped 
a lot of transactions because of big capital consumption, and the CRO applies risk models to every 
single trade.’  
 
Some participants also expressed the view that while overall the overhaul of the regulation is 
generally a positive step in the right direction that limits some of the discretions that used to be 
present under Basel II, they pointed out inconsistencies in standards. There are also elements in Basel 
III that point to uneven implementation on the part of some banks and/or shadow banks and 
opportunities for regulatory arbitrage. Such opportunities also seem to appear under liquidity 
requirements as well as will be discussed in conjunction with table 3 further below. 
 
CEO 4: ‘Real banking [emphasis added], like for example loans, deposits and trade finance is 
generally well regulated. It’s when you go away from that into complicated markets like securitisation 
and complicated business models. In mutant banking [emphasis again] where you are doing banking 
for the sake of banking where a huge opportunity for capital arbitrage is present that is when you 
need regulation. That is where Basel III needs [emphasis added] to come in.’ 
 
CRO 2: ‘To give you an example of how hard it is to instil new regulations into the city mentality you 
have only got to read the papers about RBS. I mean they got another slap on the wrist this time by the 
Australian authorities for trying to arbitrage and rig the rates for swap fixing. They have been 
punished by the PRA (Prudential Regulation Authority) for the LIBOR fixing yet their traders are still 
trying to do it in Australia. That’s the hard part for some of these big organisations where it is so 
deeply instilled into their mindset that they can’t get their head around the new rules. Quite often they 
don’t even know what the rules are and they just say it doesn’t affect me. Well actually it does affect 
you, maybe not directly but it’s got to be part of your trading strategy or part of the business model. 
The banks that are that going to suffer are the ones that can’t instil that in their business model, they 
are the banks that are going to suffer going forward because their numbers are going to fall and we 
have already seen that with banks around the world.’ 
 
CEO 6: ‘Well, Basel III is good for banks as it gives them discipline, but go to different countries 
around the world that are performing fantastic today and one realises they already stopped on Basel 
I. They haven’t implemented Basel II and they are not planning to do anything with Basel III. Basel 
III is good for the banks, it enforces discipline for capital requirements and leverage ratio but is it the 
best thing for the domestic markets? Regulation should think about the boundary involving bank risks 
and markets in periods of financial distress. What’s the association between compliance and 
efficiency?’ 
 
CFO 3: ‘Well VAR is a very important tool but it also has a lot weaknesses and any risk manager has 
to understand the weaknesses of using VAR. Let’s say you are doing an analysis of 300 days with a 
confidence interval of 99%, if you don’t have any volatility in that period, VAR is very low and as 
soon as you start to incorporate more volatility within the scenario your VAR goes up. That is one of 
the main reasons why VAR has weaknesses for example. VAR does not incorporate any liquidity 
analysis within market risk. VAR is very poor in that sense, and you have to manage VAR very 
carefully together with all the tools I have mentioned to you, such as incremental risk charges, 
stressed VAR and stress testing. The market risk framework with stressed VaR improves the banks’ 
ability to absorb losses since it adopts more severe testing parameters that reflect the ever-changing 
market conditions. Only together with other measures [emphasis added] it is a good complement but 
if you use it on its own to capture risk it is inadequate. It is a very important tool, it is a very 
important statistical tool but you have to be very careful with that tool and you need a combination of 
additional elements. I am not sure though that the methodology is applied evenly throughout 
banking.’ 
 
Some of the quotes above echo calls of various academics and professionals as possibly destabilising 
prudential supervision for either there are cases where they incorrectly classify activities as 
‘arbitraging’ or re-introduce capital arbitrage, for example, through attempts to achieve an enhanced 
diffusion of risk-weighted assets (RWAs) via the use of internal-rating-based models (IRBs) which 
allow for legitimate ‘capital-saving’ effects; one of the major aspects that regulators strive to clamp on 
in the first place. For example, as the regulation stands at the moment, banks can enhance the 
expected return of their loan portfolios by switching from riskier investments to safer allocations. 
While this is indeed the intended scope and use for the regulator such an operation can also be 
characterised as arbitrage because the change in the risk-return profile does not come from efficiency 
in the risk premium paid on the market but from the different regulatory requirements between two 
investable assets. To make this point a bit clearer, one can consider ‘safer’ collateralised securities; a 
type of instrument in wide and deep exchange by corporates and banks alike especially after the last 
crisis. An institution subject to standard regulatory checks and controls can potentially take advantage 
of the ‘insensitivity’ of capital requirements where such requirements are evaluation-conditional (i.e. 
see credit ratings) for collateralised assets. Such an institution then has a systematic motive to 
methodically accept all securities that exhibit the following combination of characteristics: maximum 
yields possibly attainable and the smallest possible security performance among collateralised 
assets/securities within the same regulatory-set, risk weight brackets. This yield-chasing operation 
allows regulated institutions to augment the returns on the regulatory capital required. Furthermore, in 
such a scenario if ratings do not discriminate among various company-specific and systematic risk 
factors, then regulation will not penalise banks accordingly for investments of high risk.  
 
Equally though, one can argue though that such a yield chasing activity results in a simultaneous, one-
sided, herd behaviour movement and ultimately is self-defeating as participants would eventually be 
forced to abandon such a strategy as the market gradually moves against them. At the same time, the 
very underlying principle for countercyclical capital requirements comes with a price tag as they can 
positively affect idiosyncratic risk taking. Regulators, in their effort to shield banks from system 
shocks, in the context of the example above, generate motivations for banks to invest individually in 
activities that become highly correlated. As a consequence, aggregate economic exposure to shocks is 
amplified since the instruments that underlie such activities also become ‘more scarce' and less liquid. 
 
The third area also seen as a field of material importance among our professional participants is the 
liquidity provision of the new regulations. The participants presented us both with their experiential 
perceptions and balance sheet examples of how banks can potentially re-allocate risks to other parts of 
the economy by transferring them to agents that might be unprepared to accept and hold such risks 
and hence risks would be dislocated.  
 
Table 3. Liquidity regulation emerging themes 
Codes Initiating Issues discussed Themes identified 
Effect of new liquidity risk regulation on (systemic) risk management 
Horizon Liquidity requirements which are the same for all banks(?) Level playing field Survival periods 
Short-term fund 
availability Treasury and Planning Swift re-organisation management  
Cash 
Immediacy 
Liquidity rules Survival 
Fear that some banks after 5 to 10 years 
will be trying to change the stress testing 
parameters once again 
Resilience(?) 
Potential future 
risks 
Stress testing potential, expansion 
needs and balance sheet size versus 
funding  
Funding plans procedures and living wills 
in place 
Eminence of 
Credible 
Contingency 
Planning  
Punitive 
Charges 
Certain business segments affected 
more than others 
Segmented markets, (i.e. securitisation and 
SME-sized entities credit uneconomic. 
Unintended 
effects/arbitrage 
UK identified 
issue 
Cohesiveness of new regulation 
proposals  
Real risks that were exposed to the 
financial system but problematic 
recognition due to the ever-increasing 
complexity within the financial system 
Lack of 
comprehension 
within the 
regulators 
Incumbent vs. 
Newcomer 
Banks 
Higher capital and structural liquidity 
requirements 
Bigger institutions can go beyond the 
minimum capital and liquidity standards in 
response to the risk 
Market reaction 
and movements 
against the 
players 
Minimum 
deposit Overnight markets slowly collapse Zero-value deposits (<30 days)  
Decrease in 
short-term 
funding 
Corporates and 
retail customers Cash immediacy 
Deposit market shrinkage / secondary 
source / dated deposit competition 
minimum of 180 days for the NSFR 
Shortage in easy 
access funds 
from banks 
Greater 
consensus Minimum liquidity requirements A solid minimum is required 
Consistency at a 
high standard 
setting level 
Legacy 
Business 
Models 
Changes instilled 
High and low-risk banks would result in 
the same valuation of risk alike in the past; 
this is not the case anymore 
Different risk 
valuations / 
piecemeal 
approach 
Balancing 
Regulatory 
Responses 
Certain transactions ‘restricted’ 
One cannot follow the same trend anymore 
/ cannot engage in the mimicking and 
replication behaviour of Basel I and Basel 
II 
Systemic risk 
reduction and 
adverse 
selection 
monitoring / 
regulate by 
exception 
 
The recent crisis has traded a focus on profitability and earnings with a focus on cash and liquidity. It 
has also marked the end of easy accessibility of cash for many corporates and the reality of a situation 
in which the financial markets are not as willing or able to readily satisfy the demand for financing. 
As a result, banks have reduced their need for external funding or seek to maximise yield on positive 
balances.  
 
With credit remaining expensive and scarce and the heightened focus on liquidity and its association 
with financial risk management, the role of the bank treasurer has been elevated dramatically. 
Liquidity management has moved up the list of priorities for treasurers and finance directors. Once 
again participants were seen to be ‘equally’ unanimous regarding certain features of the liquidity 
regulation and ‘equally’ divided regarding certain misalignment aspects of these regulations and of 
their potential effects. Starting with the positive effects, professionals agreed in general on the high-
level principles of survival, system resilience, and immediacy of response. They were also more 
sanguine on the view of assessing risks on a bank-by-bank basis as opposed to blanket responses.  
 
CTO: ‘To implement the full liquidity requirements, there is a ‘flight path’ of subsequently higher 
requirements leading up to full compliance for everyone by 2018. This is fair because you can’t say 
on day 1 you are going to have to quickly build up billions of dollars of surplus. Once the regulators 
are happy that banks have this buffer, that actually they can survive the next 30 days or 90 days and 
that its corporate loan book is covered for the next 365 days, then the stress tests just point you to 
potential future risks. They know that if those risks do occur the banks have got the [safety] net to 
cope with them. It’s like any stress testing; all it is going to do is tell you of a potential risk. What you 
then need to do is find out how you solve that potential risk. Everything is all about theoretical ideas, 
but what a bank needs to show is that it has got a contingency funding plan. I.e. if this risk happened 
what would we do. And you need to have various plans in place. Now these are things which banks 
didn’t have before which Basel III now brings. So they say yes do these stress testing but they are 
pointers. They are not saying that if you fail this test you are going to be bankrupt, it just means there 
is a chance you could go bankrupt if we do actually incur that stress. And it’s saying we got those 
potential risks, we are now going to give you a string of things we want you to do and we will make 
sure you do it; contingency funding plans and living wills which they are making all banks do now. 
When the [bankruptcy administrators] went into Lehman they couldn’t get out of [market positions] 
because they didn’t know what the bank did.’ 
CRO 1: ‘What is going to happen is in 10 years’ time, all the front office traders will be saying 
‘Ohh...Lehman was 20 years ago now and we don’t care about that’. They will be trying to change the 
stress test parameters, but as long as they can’t touch the liquidity rules, the liquidity rules will be the 
ones that are going to give you 30 days survival horizon on the LCR, your net stable funding ratio is 
going to give you your long-term funding ratios. As long as the regulators leave them in a fairly solid 
and robust manner they are the ones that will provide, if something like Lehman’s happens again, the 
immediate cash for the banks to survive the next 30 days while they re-group and find management 
actions which are going to save them.’ 
 
CCO 2: ‘Liquidity regulations and liquidity management is good for the banks. We really had a lot of 
liquidity measurements to capture like 30, 60 days survival period, before Basel III Liquidity rules 
came into force. Net stable funding ratio has not been finally defined as of today. Going forward they 
will finalise and incorporate long-term funding in the NSFR. But it is a good tool.’  
 
CFO1: I think it will reduce systemic risk because banks are going to be stronger both from a capital 
and liquidity perspective. If all banks implement equally Basel III and there is a comfort that they can 
survive for 30 days, have leverage of 3% and a 3x Tier 1 against total assets then it will reduce 
systemic risk. It not going to eliminate it, but it will mitigate it.’  
Some participants also agreed that a piecemeal approach would be the most effective in terms of 
complexity matching and coherence among regulators (i.e. distinct revisions on regulation 
applicability based on the regulator’s view of an individual bank’s balance sheet, volume, and 
complexity of its transactions), stressing the need for structured liquidity and for the increased 
regulatory focus on large and systemically important banks. 
 
CRO 3: ‘In the past doing the same product in different banks would result in the same valuation of 
risk, but now it is not the same valuation of risk because every inch of the bank is going to have a 
different capital base, liquidity and different liabilities so therefore the same business in different 
banks will have a different LCR. Therefore you can’t just follow the other banks, because your 
balance sheet may not allow you to do that sort of business. This should help improve the systemic 
risk because it stops everyone doing the same thing.’  
 
CCO 1: ‘You can’t actually hold the same positions as another bank unless you’re the same bank with 
the exact same deposit metrics, with the same capital metrics whereas under the old system everyone 
had the same capital ratio number. With Basel III it is individual numbers for every individual bank 
therefore you can’t just follow...which is what they want...to make sure we all don’t fail together.’ 
 
They stressed, however, that looking beyond the anticipated benefits there is also a big impact on the 
European economy and its financing from a cost perspective. This is due to increases in the lending 
costs as well as from a regulatory perspective, where the revision of risk evaluation by the Basel 
Committee could potentially discourage good risk management and well-diversified funded 
portfolios.  
 
CTO: ‘Banks are going to be saying our minimum deposit period is 60 days, the overnight markets 
will slowly collapse because once you get into Basel III deposits less than 30days obviously have got 
no value so you will be looking for deposits greater than 30days. But the problem with corporates and 
customers is they want as short dated as possible because they want easy access to their money and 
they are going to struggle to find a place to deposit their funds. Banks are going to be saying ‘two 
weeks money doesn’t do me any good because I can’t use it for my Basel III metrics’, so therefore 
banks are going to want 60 to180 days for the NSFR. There’s no doubt that it will have an effect on 
the real economy.’  
 
CE0 4: ‘Even though the long-term liquidity capital ratio hasn’t come into full effect yet there are a 
lot of banks who do not want to do certain transactions because it will adversely affect their LCR and 
they know they will have to meet certain LCR requirements by 2018. Before banks and institutions 
were fighting for those same transactions. LCR is the main concern, not NSFR. Liquidity 
requirements are good for banks but it has implications on the market. For instance SMEs might turn 
elsewhere if they have reduced access to the liquidity.’ 
 
CFO 2: 'Well, risk has two elements: an idiosyncratic element and a market-wide element. In hyped 
activity markets where risk builds up you have to be conscious of the market-wide mispricing element 
but what you are asking us also to do is to internalise negative externalities coming from individual 
institutions.’  
 
The latter quotes also give rise to financing relocation concerns through investment exchanging or 
(re)-structuring whereby a bank achieves equivalent financial gains of an investment vehicle at a 
lower regulatory tax charge; a side argument also is that for such firms for example by slashing 
transaction costs they also facilitate ‘more efficient pricing’. It can also be achieved by sidetracking to 
substitute conduits for making investments or acquiring credit. This is implied in the sections above 
whereby Fin-Techs (and shadow banks) as new entrants are not currently captured by the regulatory 
boundaries in order to define the level of their risk-taking activities. As things currently stand, there 
are no metrics or data to assess their leverage or their eminence in the economy. A very modern, 
highly relevant example is the case of Yu’E Bao (a Chinese money market fund owned by Alibaba, 
online firm that competes as a fintech as well) that clearly illustrates how a non-financial classed, 
systemically insignificant, small fintech firm went from ‘too-small-to-care’ to ‘too-big-to-fail’ in the 
space of nine months. When such firms obtain more pervasive roles – due to the opportunities 
presented – they grow to be more eminently involved in the banking domain by taking on crucial 
tasks (i.e. personal, SME lending, acceptances, repositories for left-over cash etc.). The incumbent 
banks and the overall macro-prudential exposure to them can increase, leading to new risks if such 
agents retract from the market.  
This may also run counter to the regulators’ calls for enhanced protection whereby the market once 
again moves against banks: agents can generally demonstrate herd behaviour, so in reality (as the 
recent crisis has practically demonstrated) they could all trade in simultaneously, and in these stress 
conditions the risk of aggregate asset sales becomes real. 
Furthermore, in tandem with addressing regulatory-driven ‘inefficiencies’ for short-term gains, 
treasurers are now forward-thinking risk managers, motivated to embed, sustainable, long-term 
liquidity capital strategies at the heart of their business by keeping more of their liquidity buffer in 
cash; relying less on revolving credit facilities from other banks and investing for the longer term 
rather than the short term. This unintended regulatory inequity could compel more individuals and 
more financial businesses from the classic towards the shadow banking market where both sets of 
agents (investors and intermediaries alike) can profit from cost gains and more lax regulation. 
CCO 1: 'It will have cost implications on treasury operations. Before you were funding your long-
term assets wholesale funding which is short-term funding. Now you have to start moving into retail 
for long-term funding. Everyone is going to start chasing the same [emphasis added] retail or more 
long-term funding which has competition implications and is more expensive. Normally as a bank it is 
very easy to fund in the short term as it is cheaper. Now with Basel III you have to move a big portion 
from short to long-term just to fund your long-term assets and that has cost implications.’  
 
CRO 2: ‘The Liquidity coverage ratio is something that is changing treasury in many ways. This is 
because you have to start thinking if I do a transaction, for example, with a collateral agreement or a 
downgrade with a client, that will have an immediate impact on the liquidity coverage ratio and you 
might not want to do that, so we may inform the client that we are unable to undertake the 
transaction.’ 
The interviews also confirm that credit creation substantially affects economic activity. It is 
understandable that from a regulator’s perspective the task is a challenging one of balancing banking 
sector stability, the competitiveness of national banks and short to medium term economic growth. 
While banks as drivers of credit provision are crucial in an economy, bank regulations have great 
impact on the entire economy rather than only in the banking sector; these tensions above might also 
further help establish and clarify some macro-economic policy tensions between agents’ motives in 
the markets. For example, for a monetary-policy-focused agent this motion has positive features, since 
it keeps the liquidity premium low and relatively unvarying over the longer term. From a monetary 
policy perspective this translates to a swift and clean diffusion to predictably stable term interest rates. 
For a regulatory-policy-driven agent where the overarching aim is financial stability, such type of 
stability could be interpreted as regulatory arbitrage that destabilises the very aim of safeguarding 
against system-wide liquidity shocks. We conclude this section by grouping and summarising 
the most important variables identified in the thematic analysis in table 4 below. 
Table 4: Categorisation of areas from the thematic analysis 
Major Categories Variables / Issues Identified 
Capital Requirements Risk Reduction and potential Risk Dislocation 
and Arbitrage, Business Constriction  
Governance Transparency, Compliance, Accountability and 
Reputation 
Business Models Mentality, Balance sheet restructuring and loss 
of business 
Operations Management Restructuring and Treasury 
centrality 
Liquidity Multi-dimensional strengthening of funding, lack 
of consensus, partial lack of coherence, herd 
behaviour and counter-productive competition 
 
Figure 2 below shows the variables change/challenges and regulatory reform.  
 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
International harmonisation of financial regulation has become a crucial focal point among regulators 
in safeguarding the stability of the financial system. The analysis presented above highlights insiders’ 
views that Basel III has largely positive anticipated effects and that banks are making good progress 
in implementing Basel III. Advances in the capital regime regulation and bank governance improve 
the inadequacies involved in Basel II. Market, counterparty, and liquidity risk elements in Basel III 
are all major improvements in capturing systemic risk. From a risk perspective, the implementation of 
Basel III promotes the broad consistency of standards for the global financial system as it also takes 
away the divergence in application that existed under Basel II. Therefore, this consistency reduces the 
potential for regulatory arbitrage and promotes financial stability. However the analysis has also 
highlighted some depressive effects of implementing Basel III, for example, reduction in competition, 
innovation, and profitability. Basel III increases regulatory change costs, which will impact banks 
with the smaller banks being hit harder since larger banks can more readily absorb increased 
regulatory costs. This reduces competition for smaller banks. Higher capital requirements have also 
impacted the ability of banks to innovate and raise capital. Banks have been forced to abandon certain 
business operations or segments and shrink - most notably - their international businesses. As a result, 
for banks to meet Basel III’s capital requirements, they are reducing their loan books fast with an 
associated large impact on lending particularly riskier sectors and lending SME lending. Some 
participants implied that this will impact economic recovery. Bankers worry that supervisors may trap 
capital that could be better deployed elsewhere.  
As argued above, regulatory authorities should seek to balance stability, competitiveness, and growth 
but an undeviating and blanket enforcement of the new standards may cause disproportionate 
compliance costs for simpler institutions, stifling competition with no material regulatory benefits. 
Basel III as currently ‘built’ provides for a certain degree of latitude regarding a regulator’s approach 
against an individual bank (i.e. assessments on a case-by-case basis). Yet, in recognition of the 
challenging tasks ahead, while the proportionality principle is seen as welcome and fair, it is almost 
certain to substantially shape the competitive market environment and provide for the unintended 
potential to reduce the regulatory-sensitivity radar and encourage unsound or imprudent behaviour. 
Reducing regulatory costs does not necessarily have to go hand-in-hand with lessening regulatory 
requirements. At the very least, complexity matching should ensure that ‘smaller’ (baseline 
obligatory) rules pertain to smaller banks with the rules scaling higher with complexity.  
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